An F-22 Raptor was designed on a succinct fighting promise, detect first, and strike first and then leave before the other aircraft can even shoot the plane clean. That is what caused one training experience to be memorable. During one Nevada test, a Navy EA-18G Growler was able to engage a simulated missile-quality strike on an F-22, which was unique exactly because the two aircraft were configured to perform different types of air combat.

The thing was that the Growler had become a better dogfighter than the Raptor. It had not. The point was that speed, stealth and turning performance are no longer the only characteristics of modern air combat. It is also a competition in the electromagnetic spectrum and the Growler itself was designed to compete in the electromagnetic spectrum.
The F-22 is still considered to be one of the strongest air-superiority aircrafts. The Air Combat Command has listed the strengths of the jet as stealth, supercruise, extreme maneuverability, sensor fusion, and pilots enjoy the benefits of integrated avionics which unify the information into a single picture. That combination offered the Raptor what one Air Force account openly acknowledged in the case of Red Flag exercises an unfair advantage. It is one thing to have a usable weapons solution even when it could be visually identified by the opponents.
This is precisely the reason why Growler result is important. The EA-18G is not a fighter but rather a fast, carrier capable electronic attack platform. Informally based on the Super Hornet, it has jamming pods and anti-radiation weapons that identify, degrade, confuse, or suppress hostile emitters. It has a mission to shatter the picture of the battle by the enemy. Radar, communications, targeting and cueing are all compromised when an aircraft such as the Growler begins to attack the spectrum instead of the airframes.
That larger lesson has been made rather more pertinent. In a 2025 study published by the National Defense University Press, it was contended that stealth aircraft continue to be vulnerable to electronic warfare support to survive, particularly against layered air defenses as well as emerging detection techniques. Stated differently, stealth is not the substitute of electronic attack. It works best alongside it.
There are also limits to stealth that can be readily exaggerated in a popular context. It minimizes detection and tracking, but does not ensure that an aircraft is invisible at all angles, in all bands, and during all phases of flight. Researchers have long identified weaknesses in low-frequency radar and infrared search-and-track systems, and situations where the weapon bays open or when enemy airplanes succeed in compelling a close-range merge. Raw kinematics, speed of pilot decision and sensor disturbance become more important once the fight has compacted.
That is one of the reasons why the F-22 has been occasionally “shot down” in training by other planes which were not part of the standard script. The German Eurofighter Typhoon has been noted to make an impression during close-in combat, and Simulated engagements have also been reportedly found to have windows by French fighters. No such episodes removed the overall strengths of the Raptor. Their display was more helpful: no airplane is dominant in all configurations, all geometries, all kill chain portions. And this simulated success of the Growler can best be viewed as a continuation of where airpower is heading. What fighter sees farther is yet a fighter. The plane which is able to make blind, disorient, or even break the consciousness of the other side can be as important.
