FAA Lets Boeing 737 MAX 10 Certification Proceed Without Software Fix

The Federal Aviation Administration has determined that a flight-management software issue affecting some Boeing 737 MAX aircraft is not a safety concern, allowing MAX 10 certification to proceed without a software update as a prerequisite. The agency’s Corrective Action Review Board reached the decision on October 2, removing a regulatory hold tied to the issue while Boeing and GE Aerospace continue developing a correction.

The malfunction can affect automated guidance after a missed approach if pilots change the programmed flight path. In certain circumstances, the system can leave automated vertical navigation and transition to a simpler form of pitch guidance, requiring additional crew action. The FAA concluded that pilots retain full control and receive clear, unambiguous indications, but customer acceptance remains a separate obstacle: Southwest Airlines and United Airlines have reportedly said they will not accept new aircraft carrying the flawed software.

That distinction between an aircraft configuration that the regulator considers certifiable and one that customers are prepared to accept is now the central issue. The FAA’s finding does not mean the software is functioning as intended, nor does it eliminate the increased workload associated with recognizing the condition and selecting another guidance mode. It means the agency determined that existing crew awareness, aircraft behavior and procedures keep the condition from crossing its threshold for a flight-safety concern.

Why the FAA did not require an immediate update

The affected code is in versions 14 and 14.1 of flight-management computer software developed by GE Aerospace. It is installed on some, but not all, 737 MAX aircraft. Version 14.1 is the version compatible with the recently certified MAX 7 and the still-uncertified MAX 10, making the review particularly consequential for Boeing’s newest variants.

Missed approaches are normal, planned procedures used when a landing cannot be completed. The relevant concern arises only when the crew changes the programmed path during that procedure. Under those conditions, the loss of vertical-navigation guidance can increase manual workload at low altitude, even though it does not remove the pilots’ ability to control the aircraft.

From a certification standpoint, a software defect does not automatically require grounding an aircraft or withholding approval. Regulators assess its effects, how clearly those effects are presented to pilots, whether crews retain control, and whether established procedures provide an adequate response. The FAA said its board included specialists in airframes, flight controls, propulsion and flight testing. Its conclusion was that the condition is apparent and manageable rather than a safety-of-flight hazard requiring correction before certification.

The agency plans to issue a special bulletin explaining how operators can recognize and respond to the behavior. Boeing has already provided operators with procedures, while Boeing and GE Aerospace are working on a permanent software change. The FAA also left room to reconsider its position if new information emerges.

Certification does not guarantee immediate delivery

For Boeing, the decision removes one obstacle but does not itself constitute MAX 10 certification. The largest member of the 737 MAX family must still complete the remaining approval process. Completed flight testing and final development-assurance and system-safety reviews form part of that broader certification work, but the software correction is no longer a condition that must be completed first.

Airlines can impose acceptance requirements that go beyond the minimum configuration approved by the regulator. Refusing an aircraft with the affected software may avoid additional training, procedural or fleet-standardization work, but it can also delay access to airplanes already incorporated into schedules and fleet plans. Boeing, meanwhile, may face the choice of holding completed aircraft, coordinating later updates or adjusting delivery sequencing if the permanent correction is not ready.

The scale makes that operational distinction significant. As of June 30, Boeing said the MAX 10 accounted for about 31% of its 4,404 undelivered 737 aircraft approximately 1,365 jets. Not all are near delivery, and the backlog does not establish how many customers would reject the current software configuration. It does show why even a narrow configuration dispute can affect a large commercial-aircraft program.

The regulatory question has now been answered: the FAA does not require the update before approving the MAX 10. The next unresolved question is practical rather than purely regulatory whether Boeing can complete the software change soon enough that initial aircraft satisfy both the FAA’s certification standard and its customers’ acceptance standards.

By Thomas Caldwell — AMI’s senior editor for mechanical and mobility engineering, covering vehicle electronics, systems integration, electrification, chassis systems, propulsion, and safety policy.