Federal Aviation Administration Clears Boeing 737 MAX 10 Software Certification Hurdle

The Federal Aviation Administration has found that a newly identified flight-computer software issue on certain Boeing 737 MAX aircraft is not a flight-safety concern, clearing an obstacle that had interrupted the MAX 10’s final certification stage. The regulator’s Corrective Action Review Board concluded that pilots retain control and receive clear cockpit indications if the condition occurs, allowing the certification process for Boeing’s largest MAX model to continue.

The condition can make an automated navigation function unavailable during certain procedures after a missed approach, increasing pilot workload without removing the crew’s ability to control the aircraft. Boeing is developing a permanent software change and has supplied interim procedures, while the FAA plans to issue operators guidance on recognizing and responding to the condition. The agency’s review determined that cockpit indications are “clear and unambiguous.”

What the safety finding establishes

The review addressed a specific question: whether the software behavior created a condition serious enough to stop the MAX 10 certification process while a correction was developed. The board’s answer was no, based on the aircraft remaining controllable and the flight crew receiving understandable indications.

That distinction matters. A software defect can still require procedures, operator communication and a permanent correction without being classified as an immediate flight-safety concern. In this case, the unavailable automation can add crew tasks during a demanding phase of flight, but the FAA found that the pilots’ authority over the aircraft is preserved. The finding does not mean the software operates as intended in every circumstance; it means the reviewed behavior does not, under the assessed conditions, cross the regulator’s threshold for a safety-of-flight issue.

The Corrective Action Review Board brought together FAA specialists in areas including airframes, flight controls, propulsion and flight testing. That multidisciplinary composition is significant because a flight-computer condition cannot be evaluated solely as a software coding matter. Certification reviewers must consider how the behavior appears in the cockpit, how pilots respond, whether aircraft control is maintained and how the issue interacts with approved procedures.

Guidance bridges the gap to a permanent change

The FAA’s planned operator bulletin and Boeing’s software work represent two different layers of corrective action. The bulletin is intended to tell operators how crews can identify and respond to the condition with the present software. Boeing’s permanent change is intended to remove or correct the underlying behavior in a future software configuration.

This staged response is common to complex certified systems when an issue is understandable and manageable but still warrants correction. Operational guidance can address the near-term human-factors question: what information crews need before encountering the condition. The software modification addresses the longer-term engineering question: how to restore the expected automated function without relying indefinitely on additional crew steps.

The FAA also left room to reconsider its determination if new information emerges. That is an important boundary around the finding. It reflects the condition and operating circumstances reviewed by the board, rather than a blanket conclusion about every software issue or every future software version on the MAX family.

Certification continues, but approval is not complete

Clearing this issue removes a late obstacle; it does not grant the MAX 10 its amended type certificate. The aircraft must still complete the remaining regulatory process, including FAA review of certification documentation and safety assessments. Boeing completed the model’s planned certification flight campaign in July after 976 flights and more than 2,060 flight hours, leaving substantial documentation and agency review work after the flying phase.

The distinction is especially important for prospective passengers and airline customers. A finding that one software condition is not a safety concern allows the broader approval effort to resume, but only the final certification decision establishes that the complete aircraft design has met the applicable requirements.

The next consequential steps are therefore the FAA’s operator guidance, Boeing’s permanent software revision and completion of the remaining certification reviews. Until the agency issues the amended type certificate, the MAX 10 is moving forward but is not yet approved to enter airline service.

By Thomas Caldwell — AMI’s senior editor for mechanical and mobility engineering, covering vehicle electronics, systems integration, electrification, chassis systems, propulsion, and safety policy.