All 16 Rassvet Satellites Reportedly Stall Low, Risking Shorter Lives

Russia’s planned alternative to Starlink faces a basic orbital contradiction: spacecraft meant to build a long-lived communications network reportedly remain where atmospheric drag is stronger and service life may be shorter. Tracking observations indicate that none of the 16 Rassvet satellites launched in July has reached the planned operational region near 800 kilometers, with most still between 300 and 400 kilometers and at least two descending.

Those observations have not been confirmed by Rassvet operator Bureau 1440 or another Russian authority. They are based on orbital data attributed to the N2YO tracking service and assessments reported by Russian Space Web. Without official propulsion data, fuel estimates or spacecraft specifications, it is not possible to determine why the satellites remain low, how much maneuvering capability they retain or whether some could still reach higher orbits.

Low altitude turns time into a propulsion problem

A low deployment orbit is not automatically evidence of spacecraft failure. Satellite operators can intentionally release spacecraft at lower altitudes, test them and then raise them gradually. The problem is what happens when the climb takes longer than planned or stops entirely.

Even in low Earth orbit, a spacecraft passes through traces of the upper atmosphere. That resistance removes orbital energy and gradually pulls the satellite downward. The NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center explains that drag can vary substantially with solar and geomagnetic activity, which heats and expands the upper atmosphere. A satellite at 300 to 400 kilometers therefore operates in a less forgiving drag environment than one near 800 kilometers.

Propulsion can counter that decay, but the propellant supply aboard a satellite is finite. Fuel spent climbing out of a low orbit or repeatedly maintaining altitude is fuel that cannot be used later for station keeping and other planned maneuvers. That does not establish how much life these particular satellites have lost; the required figures are not public. It does explain why an altitude shortfall can become a lifespan problem rather than merely a delayed commissioning milestone.

The reported descent of at least two spacecraft is more consequential than a slow climb because it indicates that their orbits are shrinking at the time of observation. It still does not identify a cause. A prior Rassvet spacecraft launched in March reportedly re-entered after never showing an orbit-raising maneuver, but that earlier loss does not prove the July satellites share the same condition.

A constellation cannot substitute altitude with satellite count

Rassvet’s challenge also operates at network scale. Russia reportedly budgeted about $1.3 billion for the system and planned to place 250 satellites in orbit by 2027, expanding to 900 by 2035. The reported current fleet consists of 32 spacecraft, of which only 12 are said to be at expected altitudes.

Communications coverage depends on more than the number of objects launched. Satellite altitude, orbital spacing, inclination, ground infrastructure and the number of functioning spacecraft together determine when users can see a satellite and how smoothly one connection can be handed to the next. The existing network reportedly provides roughly 90 minutes of connectivity per day over Ukraine, but that operational claim remains attributed to the Institute for the Study of War rather than independently confirmed performance data.

Lower satellites can offer communications advantages, including shorter signal paths, but each spacecraft sees a smaller portion of Earth at a time. Sustained coverage consequently requires enough working satellites distributed through the intended orbital planes. Spacecraft stranded below the designed altitude may not provide the coverage geometry assumed in the constellation plan, even if they remain operational.

Launch capacity makes replacement harder

The deployment plan reportedly requires at least 18 Soyuz launches, while Russia conducts only six to eight relevant launches annually. That mismatch means a weak batch cannot necessarily be replaced quickly without competing for limited launch and production capacity.

Damage was also reported at the Samara plant described as the sole producer of the required rockets following a Ukrainian strike in August. The extent of that damage and its effect on future launch availability have not been independently established, so it cannot yet be treated as a confirmed schedule impact.

For Rassvet, the next meaningful milestone is not another constellation target or readiness assertion. It is observable orbit raising by the July batch—or official data showing how operators intend to recover satellites still hundreds of kilometers below their planned operating region. Until then, every additional day at low altitude spends time under stronger drag while an 18-launch deployment requirement remains ahead.

By David Whitaker — Associate editor for AMI’s aerospace and drone systems desk, translating flight systems, aircraft programs, spaceflight, and UAV developments into accessible technical stories.