51 Open Potomac Safety Recommendations Leave Technology and Training Work Unfinished

Fifty-one of 52 National Transportation Safety Board recommendations issued after the January 2025 Potomac River midair collision remain open. That count does not mean federal agencies have taken no action. It does show that most of the board’s proposed work on collision-warning technology, pilot awareness, training and airspace management has not yet met the NTSB’s criteria for closure.

The distinction matters because an open recommendation is neither an implemented requirement nor proof that every associated condition remains unchanged. The Federal Aviation Administration has already restricted mixed helicopter and airplane traffic near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, revised helicopter routes and changed operating procedures. In January 2026, the Transportation Department also formalized restrictions on certain helicopter and powered-lift operations near the airport. But route controls address only one layer of a wider safety system.

The NTSB developed the 52 recommendations after investigating the collision between a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter and a passenger airplane over the Potomac River. The January 2025 accident killed all 67 people aboard the two aircraft. One urgent recommendation concerning helicopter operations near an active airport runway has been closed; the other 51 remain open.

Low altitude is a consequential operating boundary

Virginia Tech aerospace engineering professor and pilot Ella Atkins identifies a technical issue that deserves particular attention: collision-avoidance software tends not to function below a defined altitude. “We kind of need to go back and change the collision avoidance software, update it, so that it works all the way down to very low altitudes,” she said.

That is Atkins’ engineering assessment, not a claim that software caused the collision. It nevertheless highlights a significant systems-integration problem. A safety function may perform as intended across most of an aircraft’s operating envelope yet offer limited protection where helicopters, airplanes and airport traffic converge close to the ground.

Extending an alerting function downward is not simply a matter of changing one threshold. Designers and regulators would have to consider nuisance alerts, terrain and obstacle data, aircraft performance, traffic density, pilot workload and the time available to interpret and act on a warning. A system that produces excessive or poorly prioritized alerts can undermine trust and add workload during already demanding phases of flight.

This is why recommendation closure can take time. Rulemaking, equipment standards, certification, installation, training and operational validation are separate steps. They also have to be evaluated for unintended consequences rather than treated as interchangeable signs of progress. Atkins argues, however, that the current pace is too slow when specific safety actions have already been identified.

Data links could reduce dependence on voice radio

The communications problem extends beyond cockpit warning logic. Atkins points to data-link technology as a way for pilots and air traffic controllers to exchange information faster than voice radio alone. Digital transfer can reduce time spent reading back routine information and can preserve instructions in a form crews can review, potentially improving shared situational awareness.

Aircraft-position technology presents a related integration question. Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast can transmit an aircraft’s location, altitude and speed. Receiving capability can put nearby traffic information in the cockpit, but transmission and reception are distinct functions. A complete safety architecture therefore depends on equipment compatibility, operating rules, display design, crew training and consistent participation across different aircraft fleets.

Legislation incorporating many of the NTSB recommendations passed the House but had not received Senate approval at the time described. Similar legislation previously passed the Senate and failed in the House. The unresolved issue is less about whether technology exists than about which aircraft must carry it, how uniformly it must operate and how its costs and operational constraints should be managed.

Those decisions will reach beyond Washington airspace. Atkins notes that conventional aircraft will increasingly share low-altitude environments with drones and advanced-air-mobility vehicles. “When we have advanced air mobility going from rooftop to rooftop, and we mix in the drones, the sky is going to become quite a lot more crowded than it is now, but also complex,” she said.

That future places added weight on operating-envelope coverage, interoperable data links and human-centered alert design. The unresolved count 51 recommendations still open is therefore not just an administrative scorecard. It marks how much certification, training, equipment and policy integration remains before the proposed safety layers can function as a coherent system.

By Thomas Caldwell — AMI’s senior editor for mechanical and mobility engineering, covering vehicle electronics, systems integration, electrification, chassis systems, propulsion, and safety policy.