Transportation Security Administration Plans Private Checkpoint Expansion Beyond 20 Existing Airports

The Transportation Security Administration plans to expand privately staffed airport checkpoints beyond the 20 airports already using them. Its new Horizon 25 strategy calls for accelerating public-private partnerships through an evolved Screening Partnership Program, while also modernizing checkpoints and enhancing TSA PreCheck.

The proposal puts two airport-screening models side by side: checkpoints staffed by federal transportation security officers and checkpoints staffed by contractors under federal supervision. Shutdown-related staffing shortages have given the comparison urgency, but wait times, safety performance, full public cost and employee conditions will all be needed to judge whether expansion delivers an operational improvement.

Private staff, federal security control

The contractor model is less of a transfer of security authority than the word “privatization” may suggest. Under the Screening Partnership Program, the screening vendor works for TSA rather than the airport authority. TSA’s federal security director remains responsible for security, incident management and relations with airport stakeholders.

Contractors must follow TSA procedures and policies, including screening protocols, and use TSA-provided equipment rather than bringing in their own screening technology. Candidates also undergo the same security-background and medical checks as prospective federal officers. TSA says it monitors vendor performance, although it does not manage contractor staffing levels directly.

That structure means the principal operational variable is the workforce provider, not the underlying national security standard or checkpoint equipment. It also limits how much innovation a contractor can introduce independently. Any claimed advantage must therefore come largely from recruiting, scheduling, supervision, retention and local workforce management while complying with a common federal operating framework.

The program has operated since 2004 and spans markedly different airports. Eight of the 20 participants are in Montana, including small regional facilities, while San Francisco International is one of the country’s busiest airports. That range is useful, but it also makes simple averages risky: passenger volume, checkpoint layout, seasonal demand and local labor markets can influence performance independently of who signs the screeners’ paychecks.

Shutdown waits suggest a benefit, not a verdict

During the 2025 and 2026 government shutdowns, missed paychecks contributed to TSA staffing shortages and airport disruption. Houston Hobby and Atlanta experienced hourslong waits, while passengers at contractor-staffed San Francisco waited only minutes.

That contrast points to a potentially important continuity benefit. Contractor employees may be less directly exposed to the payroll disruption affecting federal officers during a funding lapse. But the three-airport comparison does not isolate staffing model from passenger demand, absenteeism, available lanes, checkpoint configuration or other local conditions. TSA also says wait times are generally similar at federal and contractor-staffed airports, with fluctuations driven by passenger volume.

A credible Horizon 25 assessment would therefore need matched comparisons across airports and over time. Useful measures would include average and peak waits, lanes available, passenger throughput, employee attrition, unscheduled absences and recovery time after a disruption. Security-effectiveness measures must be evaluated alongside speed so that shorter lines are not mistaken for better overall performance.

Cost claims require a complete accounting

Officials supporting greater private participation say it could save money. The available historical benchmark offers a warning against assuming that conclusion in advance. A 2009 Government Accountability Office review examined a TSA comparison that found contractor screening cost approximately 17.4% more than federal screening at selected airports while falling within an average performance range.

GAO also found important methodological weaknesses. The comparison omitted some costs, did not fully address potentially overlapping administrative functions and lacked statistical testing for observed performance differences. When TSA added some excluded items, the estimated contractor premium declined to 14.5%. GAO concluded that the study should not serve as the sole basis for major policy decisions.

Those figures are too old to establish what an expanded program would cost today, but the accounting problem remains current. A fair comparison must include contractor management and fees, federal oversight, benefits, insurance, recruitment, training, technology, transition expenses and any duplicated administrative roles. It should also distinguish savings to TSA’s budget from savings to the federal government as a whole.

Workforce conditions are equally connected to system performance. Opponents warn that contractor competition could weaken safety or working conditions. Horizon 25 will need consistent hiring standards, training, retention data, compensation comparisons and enforceable performance requirements to test those concerns rather than treating labor conditions as separate from checkpoint reliability.

Horizon 25 follows TSA’s decision to end the recently introduced Gold+ initiative after union opposition. The replacement is still a plan, not a completed expansion. Airport applications receive a decision within 60 days, but procurement and transition can each take up to another 120 days. The first meaningful result will not be how many airports express interest, but whether expanded contractor screening produces comparable security, lower full-system cost and more reliable staffing under the same federal standards.

By Thomas Caldwell — AMI’s senior editor for mechanical and mobility engineering, covering vehicle electronics, systems integration, electrification, chassis systems, propulsion, and safety policy.