United CEO Calls for Third Plane Maker After 20-Year 757 Wait

Airlines want a purpose-built successor to the Boeing 757, but the two dominant commercial-aircraft manufacturers have continued to favor existing product families over an all-new design. United Airlines CEO Scott Kirby brought that tension into public view on October 27, saying he has pressed Boeing and Airbus for a 757 replacement for more than 20 years and now believes the industry needs a third major manufacturer.

“We need a third aircraft manufacturer, to be blunt,” Kirby said. He argued that limited competitive pressure has reduced the incentive for Boeing and Airbus to invest in new airframes. Kirby characterized their restraint as a quiet, unofficial understanding, but his assessment does not establish that the companies reached an agreement. The observable result is narrower: Boeing ended 757 production in 2004, and neither manufacturer has introduced a clean-sheet aircraft specifically designed to take over its role.

Why the 757 role remains difficult to replace

The 757 occupied a useful position between conventional narrowbody operations and missions that might otherwise require a larger widebody. Its combination of capacity, range and operating performance enabled airlines to connect smaller markets, including thinner routes between North America and Europe, without committing a larger aircraft to demand that might not support it.

That mission creates a difficult design and business target. A successor must offer enough range and capacity to open long, relatively thin routes while remaining economical for markets that cannot reliably fill a widebody. An aircraft optimized around that requirement could differ from a narrowbody that has gained range through successive development of an existing platform.

Boeing examined a middle-of-the-market aircraft, commonly associated with the proposed 797, but never launched it. Airbus has moved into part of the gap with the A321XLR, delivering the first example to Iberia in October 2024. The XLR extends the capabilities of the A320neo family, however, rather than introducing an entirely new airframe built around the 757 replacement mission.

That distinction carries both benefits and limits. Developing within an established family can preserve production systems, supplier relationships and fleet compatibility. Airlines can also draw on existing experience with the broader aircraft family. A clean-sheet program offers more freedom to optimize the airframe for a particular capacity-and-range target, but it requires substantially more engineering work and exposes both the manufacturer and its customers to greater program risk.

A new competitor faces more than a design challenge

An industry estimate places the potential cost of developing a clean-sheet commercial aircraft as high as $30 billion. The burden extends beyond designing and testing the airframe. A manufacturer must complete certification, secure engine and supplier partnerships, establish production capacity and convince airlines that parts, maintenance support and technical service will remain available over a fleet life measured in decades.

Fleet integration raises another barrier. Airlines evaluate more than an aircraft’s published performance: a new type must fit training, maintenance, scheduling and support systems. An established family can reduce those integration demands, while a new manufacturer must earn confidence before it has a large operating fleet or mature support network. That makes entry difficult even when airlines identify a real gap in the market.

United is putting limited support behind one unconventional challenger. In April 2025, the airline announced an investment and conditional purchase agreement with JetZero that could cover 100 aircraft plus options for another 100. JetZero is developing a blended-wing-body aircraft intended to carry approximately 250 passengers. United later included JetZero among the aerospace startups backed by United Airlines Ventures in a January 2026 company update.

The agreement is contingent on JetZero meeting development milestones and satisfying United’s operational and commercial requirements. A full-scale demonstrator flight was targeted for 2027. The proposed aircraft is not a near-term, direct 757 replacement, but United’s involvement shows how an airline can encourage additional aircraft development without removing the certification, manufacturing and support barriers facing a newcomer.

Kirby’s call for a third manufacturer therefore runs into the same constraint that has kept the 757 niche open: the aircraft may be technically definable and commercially desirable, yet the cost of creating, certifying and supporting an entirely new platform can outweigh the pressure to launch it. The next concrete test will be whether emerging manufacturers can move beyond demonstrators and conditional airline commitments into certified, supportable production aircraft.

By Thomas Caldwell — AMI’s senior editor for mechanical and mobility engineering, covering vehicle electronics, systems integration, electrification, chassis systems, propulsion, and safety policy.