FAA Clears Boeing 737 MAX Glitch, Removing Certification Obstacle

The Federal Aviation Administration has determined that a newly identified Boeing 737 MAX software glitch is not a flight-safety issue, removing that condition as a potential obstacle to certification of the larger MAX 10. The agency reached its finding through a corrective action review board on October 2, after the issue had briefly interrupted the aircraft’s approval path.

The glitch can arise after a missed approach when pilots change a programmed flight path before another landing attempt. The FAA concluded that pilots retain full control and receive “clear and unambiguous” cockpit indications if the anomaly occurs. Boeing plans to give operators guidance for recognizing it, and the FAA said it will follow with a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin explaining how to respond.

The finding is narrow but consequential. It says this particular failure condition can be managed safely; it does not declare the underlying software defect fixed. Pilots may need additional steps to use automated tools on a subsequent approach, so the system’s behavior still carries a workload consequence during a demanding phase of flight. The distinction between a manageable defect and an eliminated defect is central to understanding the decision.

Why approved software does not mean defect-free software

Commercial-aircraft certification does not require software to be free of every anomaly. Regulators assess what a failure does, whether crews can identify it, whether control remains available and whether procedures provide an acceptable response. In this case, the FAA’s decisive factors were continued pilot authority and unmistakable indications not an assertion that the navigation function always behaves as intended.

That human-factors boundary matters after a missed approach. Crews are reconfiguring the aircraft, following air-traffic-control instructions and preparing for another approach. A loss or change of automated guidance can add tasks at precisely that point. FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford had described workload as the issue under examination before the review board reached its decision. The board ultimately found that the additional burden did not elevate this condition into a flight-safety concern.

The FAA can reconsider its response if new information emerges. For now, guidance rather than immediate corrective regulation is the planned action for this anomaly. A Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin alerts operators to a condition and recommended handling, but it is distinct from an airworthiness directive mandating corrective action.

Airlines still prefer older software

The regulatory clearance does not remove a broader operational tension. U.S. airlines flying certified MAX 8 and MAX 9 aircraft have reportedly avoided versions U14 and U14.1, while United Airlines reverted to the older U13 software. American Airlines and Alaska Airlines said their single-aisle aircraft did not use U14 or U14.1.

Those choices illustrate how airline fleet policy can be more conservative or simply more operationally selective than the certification baseline. Boeing says operators can safely use every approved version. Airlines, however, must also consider dispatch reliability, crew workload, training, maintenance consistency and the particular anomalies attached to each release. Legal approval establishes an acceptable safety floor; it does not require operators to regard every version as equally desirable.

The history of the newer releases helps explain that caution. The National Transportation Safety Board found that resets of both flight-management computer displays contributed to crew distraction during a United MAX 9 wrong-runway landing in Pittsburgh in 2022. Nobody was injured and the aircraft was not damaged. Investigators traced that display-reset fault to a change introduced in U14. The problem was absent from U13 and was corrected in U14.1, making it separate from the newly reviewed post-missed-approach anomaly.

Yet remaining on U13 is not equivalent to choosing flawless code. The FAA has identified a separate misleading-vertical-guidance problem in that version, classified it as a low safety risk and is preparing a proposed rule that could lead to an airworthiness directive. The agency said that issue was found during simulator sessions and, to its knowledge, has not occurred in airline service.

Certification clearance is not the end of development

The FAA decision means the MAX 10 certification process, and the MAX 7’s delivery path, should not have to wait for the next software iteration solely because of the reviewed anomaly. That is a program-level consequence, but it does not predetermine the final timing of certification or eliminate any other work regulators may require.

Boeing and GE Aerospace are developing U14.2, reportedly expected in 2028. Until a later version consolidates the fixes, operators face an unusual but permissible systems-management choice: use approved software releases with different known limitations, then control the residual risk through procedures, training and configuration policy.

For passengers, the counterintuitive point is that different airlines can safely operate different approved software versions while making different judgments about reliability and pilot workload. The FAA has removed one certification obstacle, but the continuing avoidance of newer software shows why formal approval and operator acceptance remain separate gates.

By Thomas Caldwell — AMI’s senior editor for mechanical and mobility engineering, covering vehicle electronics, systems integration, electrification, chassis systems, propulsion, and safety policy.