Ukrainian Drone Campaign Cuts Russian Refining and Forces Record Fuel Imports
Russia assumed its oil refineries would remain outside the conflict. That assumption has now collided with reduced fuel production, shortages and an unusual dependence on imported petroleum products. On September 3, President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that Moscow had been mistaken about the facilities remaining untouched and warned that Russians should be prepared for continuing supply disruption.
The scale is no longer limited to isolated plant outages. Bloomberg counted at least 21 attacks on Russian refineries in August, the highest monthly figure cited in the available reporting. The precise share involving drones and the total damaged capacity have not been independently established, but the broader campaign has clearly become a refining, distribution and industrial-recovery problem rather than only a site-security problem.
Lost processing capacity is harder to replace than crude oil
Russia still has crude oil. Its immediate constraint is converting enough of that feedstock into gasoline, diesel and other finished products where and when they are needed. The International Energy Agency reported that refinery throughput fell to 3.8 million barrels per day in June, the lowest level in more than 20 years and about 30% below the previous year.
That distinction matters because a refinery is not one interchangeable machine. It is a connected industrial system containing primary processing equipment and more complex secondary units that raise the yield and quality of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel. Restoring output therefore depends not only on repairing visible damage, but also on obtaining specialized equipment, coordinating contractors, testing units and safely reintegrating them into an operating plant.
Putin said oil companies were strengthening facility defenses and restoring damaged plants. He also claimed that only 10% of affected refining capacity remained to be restored and would return soon. That recovery figure has not been independently verified, and no comprehensive official totals for damaged capacity, lost production or repair schedules were provided.
The IEA expects the cumulative repair burden to keep processing rates constrained. Its September analysis forecast Russian refinery throughput averaging about 4 million barrels per day for the remainder of 2026 and through 2027. That is well below Russia’s roughly 6.5 million barrels per day of installed capacity, although installed capacity and sustainable operating output are not directly equivalent.
Imports reveal the logistics cost of unavailable refineries
The sharpest indication of the supply reversal is Russia’s move to buy fuel abroad. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air calculated that Russia imported 172,000 tonnes of oil products in August more than seven times its previous monthly high and three times the volume imported during all of 2025. Gasoline represented 74% of those imports, compared with an average of 6% between 2023 and 2025.
India supplied 70% of Russia’s imported oil products that month, including 120,000 tonnes of gasoline, according to the group. Other reporting identifies supplies from Kazakhstan and Morocco, while the research center also recorded products arriving from South Korea and Egypt. The country that historically exported large volumes of refined products is consequently paying for overseas processing and added transportation to replace some unavailable domestic output.
Imports can cushion shortages, but they are not a direct substitute for local refinery availability. Overseas cargoes add freight, handling and delivery time, while rail and port capacity determine how quickly fuel can reach inland markets. Distribution must also balance motorists’ gasoline demand against diesel requirements from agriculture, freight and industry. A national production total can therefore obscure regional shortages if replacement fuel enters far from where it is needed.
Air defense and repair capacity now compete for resources
Putin described greater air-defense capability as the effective response while the war continues. At a systems level, however, refinery protection presents a scale problem: operators must cover multiple large industrial facilities while maintaining production, conducting repairs and preserving safe access for workers. Stronger defenses can reduce risk, but they do not eliminate the need for spare equipment, restoration crews and contingency fuel logistics.
The campaign also creates a difficult readiness cycle. Repairs return capacity, yet repeated disruption can send the same industrial workforce and supply chain back through inspection, replacement and recommissioning work. Delayed maintenance may preserve near-term output but can narrow operators’ flexibility later. None of this establishes the condition of any individual facility; it explains why aggregate recovery can lag behind announcements that a plant or unit has restarted.
The remaining uncertainty is substantial. There is no independently verified total for lost Russian refining capacity, and Moscow’s near-term restoration claim remains attributed. What is measurable is the direction of travel: throughput reached a two-decade low, August imports set a record, and gasoline became nearly three-quarters of imported oil products. Russia’s original assumption concerned whether refineries would be attacked; its continuing challenge is whether defense, repair and fuel logistics can restore supply faster than disruption removes it.
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By Stephen Wallace — Editor for AMI’s aerospace integration and unmanned mobility coverage, focused on drone manufacturing, VTOL systems, autonomous networks, and air-ground mobility links.
