NTSB Says Missed Water in Both Fuel Tanks Caused Fatal Greenwich Crash

Water in both fuel tanks, undetected during a reported preflight inspection, caused the engine-power loss preceding a fatal airplane crash in Greenwich, Connecticut, the National Transportation Safety Board has concluded. Investigators found leakage around both fuel caps and damage to the left cap, but no defect in the engine itself.

Image Credit to wikimedia.org

The Nov. 3 finding resolves the central mechanical question surrounding the Dec. 12, 2024 crash. The single-engine airplane was traveling from Linden, New Jersey, to Albany, New York, when it lost power. The pilots diverted toward Westchester County Airport, and power briefly returned after they switched fuel tanks before failing again. The airplane crashed in the center median of Interstate 684, killing commercial-rated safety pilot and flight instructor Jacob Yankele Friedman, 32, and seriously injuring owner and private pilot Kalmen Goldberger, 26.

A clean check did not mean clean fuel

The investigation centers on a difficult mismatch: Goldberger reported that the preflight inspection and engine run-up revealed no anomalies, yet the post-accident examination found water in both tanks. Investigators also documented leakage around both fuel caps and mechanical damage to the left cap. The NTSB determined that some, if not all, of the water likely entered past the caps during heavy rain in the days before departure.

Preflight fuel checks are intended to expose this kind of contamination. A pilot normally draws samples from the drains or sumps at low points in the fuel system, then checks the samples for the expected fuel color, water and debris. But water does not necessarily move immediately to those drains. Tank geometry and internal features can hold it away from a sampling point until aircraft movement releases it.

There is another recognition problem. A fuel sample that is entirely or almost entirely water can appear clear, potentially making it less obvious than distinct water droplets beneath colored aviation gasoline. A continuing-airworthiness notice from New Zealand’s aviation authority describes an earlier engine-failure case in which a sample reported as “clear and bright” may actually have been water after rain entered through a failed cap seal. That fuel-cap notice calls for attention to seals, locking mechanisms and filler-neck condition, linking the quality of the fuel check to the physical integrity of the tank closure.

Switching tanks revealed the scope of contamination

The temporary restoration of power after the pilots selected the other tank was consistent with fuel supply changing as the source changed. Its subsequent loss indicated that the alternative tank could not provide sustained uncontaminated fuel either. The examination later confirmed water in the left and right tanks, explaining why switching tanks produced only a temporary recovery rather than a durable solution.

That sequence also separates fuel contamination from an underlying engine failure. The engine was capable of producing power again after the tank change, and investigators found no engine problem during the post-accident review. The NTSB attributed the power loss to water contamination rather than a mechanical defect in the powerplant.

The exact share of water that entered through each cap remains less definite. The NTSB said some, if not all, likely resulted from the preceding heavy rain. The confirmed findings are broader: both tanks contained water, both caps leaked during examination, and the left cap had mechanical damage.

An earlier stoppage was a missed systems warning

About five months before the crash, water-contaminated fuel had already caused the airplane’s engine to stop. The cap seals were reported to be in good condition at that time, but the root cause of the contamination was not investigated. That left unresolved whether the water came through a cap, accumulated elsewhere in the fuel system or entered through another pathway.

From a systems-safety perspective, a previous contamination event is more than an isolated maintenance entry. It establishes a repeatable hazard that connects the tank sealing system, drainage points, inspection method and exposure to weather. Without identifying the entry path, correcting it and confirming that the inspection process can reliably reveal remaining water, the system can return to service with the initiating condition still present.

The timing of other maintenance did not prevent that recurrence. The airplane underwent an annual inspection less than two weeks before the crash and two days before Goldberger purchased it. An annual inspection and a preflight check serve different functions, but neither result by itself guarantees that rainwater cannot subsequently enter or remain hidden in a tank.

Guidance on checking aircraft fuel samples notes that trapped water can reach fuel lines only after turns or bumps dislodge it. In Greenwich, the final investigation found the consequential chain: rainwater likely passed ineffective fuel-cap sealing, remained undetected before departure and reached an otherwise mechanically sound engine. The earlier water-related stoppage had already shown that this airplane’s fuel system required an answer more durable than a clean-looking sample.

More aerospace and engineering stories, right in your MSN feed.
Follow AMI on MSN

By Thomas Caldwell — AMI’s senior editor for mechanical and mobility engineering, covering vehicle electronics, systems integration, electrification, chassis systems, propulsion, and safety policy.

Leave a Reply