Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command Lack Domestic Drone-Swarm Defenses
The commands responsible for defending North American airspace face a threat that reverses their traditional operating problem: numerous inexpensive drones launched from inside the United States rather than an aircraft or missile approaching from far beyond its borders. Army Lt. Gen. Joseph Jarrard warned on Aug. 13 that U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command lack the sensors and interceptors needed to handle such a domestic swarm.
“We don’t have the sensors,” Jarrard said at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Alabama. He described the commands as “ill-equipped right now” and added that the necessary mitigation capability is not yet in place. Jarrard serves as Northern Command’s deputy commander and vice commander of NORAD’s U.S. element. His comments were a readiness assessment, not a report that a domestic swarm attack has occurred.
A different detection problem
NORAD’s established mission includes aerospace warning and control for North America. Its broader architecture uses satellites, ground and airborne radar, and alert aircraft to identify and respond to activity approaching or operating within U.S. and Canadian airspace.
Small drones originating inside the country present a different systems challenge. The warning area is no longer concentrated at distant approaches, while low-cost aircraft can appear within an already busy domestic environment. Jarrard identified detection as the biggest issue and said existing radars are being used where possible, but he also called for connections with systems operated by federal and local law-enforcement organizations.
That distinction matters because “more sensors” alone would not constitute a complete defense. A useful counter-drone network must turn observations into a dependable chain of detection, identification, tracking, decision-making and authorized response. It also has to exchange information across equipment purchased by different military and civilian agencies. Jarrard said those systems need to be interoperable and able to communicate with one another.
The interceptor side creates a second constraint. A command may detect multiple drones yet still lack an available, authorized and proportionate means to stop them. Jarrard did not identify which sensor categories or interceptors are missing, how many systems would be required, or whether the intended architecture would be fixed, mobile or shared among agencies. No selected technical remedy, funded deployment plan or deadline was announced.
Authority and certification are part of the system
Domestic counter-drone operations are not solely a military hardware problem. They intersect with civilian airspace, communications law, privacy requirements and the legal treatment of drones as aircraft. A Congressional Research Service overview of current counter-drone authorities explains that federal law has historically restricted activities such as intercepting communications, interfering with signals and disabling aircraft.
The fiscal 2026 SAFER SKIES Act expanded authority for trained and certified state, local, tribal and territorial law-enforcement and correctional agencies. Rules issued by the Justice and Homeland Security departments divide certification into detection-and-warning and mitigation categories. Authorized agencies must also use approved technology, coordinate relevant operations and follow reporting, airspace and privacy requirements.
That framework illustrates why homeland defense cannot be reduced to purchasing a detector and an interceptor from a catalog. Products must be evaluated, operators trained, data shared in compatible formats and mitigation actions coordinated with the agencies responsible for the surrounding airspace. Those institutional requirements can determine whether technically capable equipment is usable when needed.
Procurement activity has not closed the gap
The Pentagon has been directing substantial resources toward the problem. Its fiscal 2026 budget request included $3.1 billion for counter-drone capabilities across the military services. A Defense Department counter-drone marketplace launched in August 2026 is also intended to help approved government buyers find and request vetted systems.
Northern Command already has mobile counter-drone packages that combine sensing and mitigation equipment, and it has used exercises to assess and integrate technologies. Those activities show that counter-drone work is underway, but they do not contradict Jarrard’s broader conclusion: the commands do not currently possess the coverage and interception capability required for the swarm scenario he described.
The unresolved questions now concern architecture and responsibility. Officials have not specified the required sensor coverage, the balance between permanent and deployable systems, the number or type of interceptors, the agency boundaries for domestic responses, or a procurement milestone that would mark the gap as closed. Until those decisions become concrete, Northern Command and NORAD remain responsible for a domestic drone-swarm problem that their deputy commander says their present systems cannot adequately handle.
By Stephen Wallace — Editor for AMI’s aerospace integration and unmanned mobility coverage, focused on drone manufacturing, VTOL systems, autonomous networks, and air-ground mobility links.
