NORAD Deputy Commander Says U.S. Cannot Consistently Stop Homeland Drone Swarms
NORAD helps defend North American airspace, but its deputy commander says the United States cannot consistently detect and stop a drone swarm launched from within the country. Army Lt. Gen. Joseph Jarrard said protection would depend on the attack location and whether authorities had both suitable sensors and counter-drone equipment there.
Speaking August 13 at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, Jarrard answered “No” when asked whether the homeland could currently be defended against such an attack. “We don’t have the sensors,” he said, according to a detailed account of his remarks. He described the country as “ill-equipped right now” and identified detection as the biggest issue.
That assessment does not mean every military installation or sensitive site lacks drone defenses. It means the available equipment, coverage and authority do not yet form a consistent nationwide system. A location may have a capable radar but no suitable response equipment, while another may have neither. Equipment owned by different agencies may also lack the interfaces and common operating procedures needed to work as one network.
Small drones create a different detection problem
Traditional homeland air defense was built primarily around aircraft and other threats approaching through monitored airspace. A small drone launched nearby presents a different engineering problem: it can operate low, appear with little warning and occupy airspace shared with legitimate civilian activity.
For a counter-drone network, detection is only the first stage. Sensors must find an object, maintain a track, help distinguish it from other airborne activity and provide usable information to whoever has authority to respond. Coverage gaps or incompatible data formats can break that chain even when individual components perform as designed.
NORTHCOM and NORAD are incorporating practices from Operation Noble Eagle into the counter-drone mission. Established after the September 11 attacks, Noble Eagle expanded homeland air patrols, surveillance and readiness. Its command relationships and air-defense procedures offer a starting point, but they were not originally designed around numerous small aircraft appearing close to protected locations.
Jarrard said military systems must also interoperate with equipment acquired by federal authorities and local law enforcement. “They’ve all got to talk together,” he said. That requirement reaches beyond connecting sensor feeds. Agencies need compatible communications, shared identification procedures and a clear understanding of who can authorize a response in civilian airspace.
Deployable equipment cannot replace persistent coverage
NORTHCOM already operates mobile counter-drone packages that can be sent to military installations. These fly-away kits combine equipment intended to detect, assess and defeat small drones, giving commanders a way to reinforce a location for a known need or planned event.
The deployment model has an inherent boundary, however: a kit must be requested and delivered. It can strengthen a selected site, but it is not equivalent to permanent detection and response coverage across the homeland. An event with little or no warning may unfold before mobile equipment can arrive.
This distinction separates equipment availability from system readiness. A collection of deployable sensors and countermeasures can be useful without providing continuous protection. Nationwide coverage would also require trained operators, maintenance, reliable communications and repeated testing across equipment from multiple manufacturers and agencies.
Federal procurement efforts illustrate the scale of that integration challenge. The Department of Homeland Security has awarded counter-drone contract positions covering hardware, software, training, maintenance and system-integration services. Those purchases can expand capacity, but buying components does not by itself establish common performance standards or ensure that independently acquired systems exchange information reliably.
Response authority is part of the architecture
Domestic counter-drone operations also face constraints that do not apply in the same way to overseas military environments. Cities and civilian infrastructure contain people, legitimate aircraft, communications networks and other systems that a response must avoid disrupting. The technically available countermeasure may not be appropriate or legally available to every operator in every location.
Authorities for trained state and local officers expanded in late 2025, but implementation has required federal supervision, training standards and approved equipment rules. That makes decision authority a functional part of system design: a detection network is less useful if information cannot reach an authorized decision-maker quickly enough.
Passive protection provides another layer rather than a nationwide solution. Pentagon guidance issued in February encouraged measures including netting and cables around critical infrastructure. Such barriers may protect selected assets without requiring an active interception decision, but they are site-specific and do not solve the broader detection, tracking or coordination problem.
The next measurable step is Falcon Peak 26.2, an experimentation event planned for late August into early September at Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona. NORTHCOM, NORAD and Joint Interagency Task Force 401 are expected to use the event to assess counter-drone technologies and procedures. The central test is not simply whether one sensor or countermeasure works it is whether multiple systems and organizations can produce a timely, shared response before a mobile kit has to be called in.
By Stephen Wallace — Editor for AMI’s aerospace integration and unmanned mobility coverage, focused on drone manufacturing, VTOL systems, autonomous networks, and air-ground mobility links.
