Investigators Find Accidental Climb Command Caused ANA Boeing 787 Tail Strike

Half a second after an All Nippon Airways Boeing 787-9 touched down normally in Houston, its automated flight controls received a command associated with climbing away from the runway. The aircraft’s nose rose, its tail-strike protection responded but could not stop the movement, and the lower fuselage hit the runway. The aircraft sustained substantial damage, although none of the 209 people aboard was injured.

The National Transportation Safety Board’s final report, published September 8, found that the captain inadvertently activated the takeoff/go-around switch while reaching for the thrust reversers. Investigators identified the resulting pitch increase, which was not corrected before runway contact, as the probable cause of the February 27, 2026 accident.

A command intended for a different phase of flight

The takeoff/go-around switch, commonly called the TOGA switch, tells automated systems to establish modes used for takeoff or an aborted landing. In this case, the aircraft had already completed an instrument approach and touched down on runway 26L using its autoland system.

Recorded data showed that the autopilot pitch and autothrottle systems were in flare mode at touchdown. About 0.5 seconds later, the TOGA switch was pressed. Both systems consequently transitioned into go-around mode because the conditions that inhibit TOGA activation had not yet been satisfied.

The two automated responses then diverged. Movement of the thrust levers into reverse canceled the autothrottle’s go-around mode, so the engines did not continue acting on the climb command. The autopilot’s pitch mode, however, remained in TOGA and commanded the elevator and stabilizer toward a go-around attitude.

That distinction is central to the accident. Reverse thrust addressed deceleration after landing, but it did not cancel the pitch command still being followed by the autopilot. The aircraft’s pitch increased from 3.5 degrees to 7.4 degrees in two seconds and eventually reached 7.8 degrees, enough for the lower aft fuselage to contact the runway.

Protection activated but had limited control authority

The 787’s tail-strike protection function did not remain passive. Flight data showed that it activated after the TOGA switch was pressed and commanded elevator movement intended to reduce the developing pitch increase. Investigators found, however, that the function had limited authority and could not override enough of the commanded movement to prevent runway contact.

This is an important boundary in interpreting aircraft protection systems. Activation does not necessarily mean that a protective function has unlimited control over the airplane or can negate every conflicting command. Here, the system recognized the tail-strike condition and responded, but the available correction was insufficient within the short time and pitch excursion documented by investigators.

The crew’s recognition time also mattered. About five seconds after TOGA mode activated, the control column was pushed forward. Two seconds later, the recorded forward force peaked at 40 pounds and disconnected the autopilot. The captain lowered the nose, then moderated the input to avoid bringing the nose landing gear down forcefully. The landing roll was completed manually without another reported problem or an evacuation.

The first officer recalled seeing the takeoff/go-around indications on the primary flight display, while neither pilot recalled pressing the switch. With no evidence of an autopilot malfunction, the NTSB concluded that the captain likely activated it inadvertently while moving his hand to select reverse thrust. Delayed detection of the rising pitch prevented corrective input early enough to avert the strike.

Damage was substantial, but investigators excluded mechanical failure

Inspection found abrasion along the lower fuselage, three full-depth cracks, damage to the rear radio antenna and grinding damage to the tail-strike sensor. Two cracks extended 35 inches and 31 inches along adjacent structural cavities; another measured about 2.3 inches by 0.15 inches. The NTSB classified the aircraft damage as substantial.

There was no fire, and all 197 passengers and 12 crew members were uninjured. Investigators identified no mechanical malfunction or component failure as a contributing factor. The runway was also dry, and the crew reported no difficulty during the approach before the normal main-gear touchdown.

The final report documents no resulting design, training or regulatory change. Its immediate safety value is therefore diagnostic rather than prescriptive: a valid but unintended mode selection occurred during a routine hand movement, the automation followed that selection, and a separate protective function lacked enough authority to prevent contact before the crew intervened.

By Thomas Caldwell — AMI’s senior editor for mechanical and mobility engineering, covering vehicle electronics, systems integration, electrification, chassis systems, propulsion, and safety policy.