US Reportedly Warns Tomahawk Deliveries Could Take Up to Five Years

The United States has reportedly warned European allies that some major weapons deliveries could slip by as much as five years while it rebuilds depleted missile inventories. The clearest case is Germany’s request for Tomahawk cruise missiles and Typhon ground launchers: RTX subsidiary Raytheon is reportedly unlikely to fulfill that order within five years because available missiles and factory output are constrained, according to accounts from American and European officials.

The tension extends beyond one German purchase. Ukraine is seeking additional Patriot interceptors, European customers are waiting for American systems, and the United States must replenish its own strategic reserves. Japan was warned in April that its Tomahawk deliveries could be delayed by up to two years. Two officials also reported delays affecting some Eastern European operators of U.S. weapons shortly after the war involving the United States, Israel and Iran began.

Missile demand is colliding with production lead times

Missile inventories cannot be restored at the speed at which governments can approve new orders. An interceptor or cruise missile moves through a production network involving propulsion, guidance, electronics, seekers, energetic materials and final assembly. Increasing output depends on suppliers expanding those stages together, not simply keeping an existing assembly line open longer.

That distinction matters because the publicly discussed shortage combines two different constraints: fewer missiles immediately available for transfer and limited annual capacity to replace them. Washington can reorder deliveries or prioritize customers, but those decisions redistribute a scarce supply rather than create additional rounds. Building new capacity requires equipment, qualified workers, supplier commitments and long-term purchasing agreements that justify the investment.

Bloomberg estimated that U.S. forces expended more than half of the country’s most advanced Patriot missiles, roughly one-third of its Tomahawk inventory and almost half of its precision Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missiles and interceptors during the Iran war. Those are attributed estimates, not confirmed official inventory counts. The Pentagon has, however, acknowledged that heavy munitions use created a strategic-reserve deficit and exposed industrial weaknesses that impede rapid replenishment.

The Defense Department is now working to shorten procurement and production lead times while stockpiling critical materials, components and selected munitions. That can reduce exposure to individual supply disruptions, but it does not erase the time required to expand manufacturing across multiple tiers of contractors.

The Patriot expansion illustrates the scale and the delay

Lockheed Martin is working to raise annual production of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement interceptor from approximately 600 to 2,000. The higher figure is a target, not an achieved production rate.

One supporting step came through an approximately $14.7 billion, seven-year Pentagon agreement under which Boeing is set to triple production of seekers for the interceptor. The seven-year production arrangement underscores why a large capacity increase does not translate into immediate deliveries. A seeker expansion supports higher final output only when motors, control hardware, electronics and assembly capacity rise with it.

For Ukraine, the supply problem is particularly immediate. The United States continues transferring weapons purchased by European allies through NATO and European Union initiatives, while European representatives plan to seek more Patriot missiles and permission to manufacture them in Europe. Neither additional missile allocations nor a European production arrangement has been finalized in the information available.

Germany is pursuing a similar industrial angle. Its defense ministry is preparing to earmark nearly €3.4 billion for Tomahawk missiles and Typhon launchers while seeking a role for European manufacturers in the supply chain. However, no production model or industrial workshare has yet been agreed, and Washington would retain control over sensitive technology.

European participation could diversify capacity over time, but licensing, technology controls, supplier qualification and investment decisions make it a long-term response rather than a quick fix. Until higher production rates are operating across the full supply chain, allied orders will continue competing with U.S. replenishment requirements. Germany’s reported five-year wait is therefore more than a scheduling problem: it is a measure of how slowly missile manufacturing can recover after expenditure outruns established factory throughput.

By David Whitaker — Associate editor for AMI’s aerospace and drone systems desk, translating flight systems, aircraft programs, spaceflight, and UAV developments into accessible technical stories.