Pentagon Cannot Verify 17,000 F-35 Parts Worth Up to $2.5 Billion

The Pentagon could not verify the status of more than 17,000 F-35 parts absent from its inventory system as of March 2026, according to Government Accountability Office findings published November 9. Recorded data valued those components at an estimated $1.3 billion, while their potential acquisition cost could reach $2.5 billion after missing prices and other acquisition expenses are included.

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Those figures describe an accounting and asset-visibility problem, not a finding that $2.5 billion in hardware physically vanished. Some of the parts may be undergoing repair, sitting at contractor facilities or moving through commercial shipping networks without a current entry in the government’s database. The operational problem is that the F-35 Joint Program Office cannot reliably distinguish those cases from actual losses or confidently determine which components will be available when maintainers need them.

Two separate groups of parts

The 17,000-plus components should not be confused with more than one million F-35 spare parts valued at over $85 million that a prime contractor reported lost between May 2018 and October 2022. GAO first examined that earlier group in May 2023, when the program office had reviewed the circumstances surrounding fewer than 2 percent of the identified losses.

The newer review found that the earlier cases remained unresolved as of March 2026. The Joint Program Office lacked sufficiently complete records to determine whether subsequent loss reports covered the same million-plus parts. These are therefore two distinct findings: one concerns previously reported losses worth more than $85 million, while the other concerns more than 17,000 maintenance or repair items absent from the inventory system and carrying an estimated recorded value of $1.3 billion.

A global pool without a unified real-time picture

The scale of the F-35 support system makes record quality consequential. Its global inventory contains approximately 26 million parts worth about $31 billion, spread across more than 700 government and contractor-managed facilities. The pool ranges from engines and tires to bolts and screws and supports U.S. military services as well as foreign operators.

Unlike a conventional supply chain in which each operator controls a self-contained stock of spares, the F-35 uses a shared global pool. That arrangement can reduce duplicated inventory and position components where demand is expected, but it also makes reliable identification and movement data essential. A part recorded at the wrong facility or not recorded at all cannot be allocated with confidence, even if it remains physically intact.

The government’s logistics platform can record inventory changes in real time, but it does not directly interface with the property-management systems operated by prime contractors Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney. The program office instead depends partly on periodic contractor submissions. Data for the shared spares pool may arrive quarterly, leaving some records more than three months old.

Completeness is another constraint. In one December 2025 contractor submission, only 29 percent of parts records included serial numbers and 43 percent included National Stock Numbers. Some records listed component costs of one cent or less, indicating data-quality problems. Without consistent identifiers, locations and credible prices, the Pentagon cannot easily reconcile what contractors report with what facilities physically hold.

Why uncertain inventory affects maintenance and purchasing

Maintenance planners need to know whether a required component is serviceable, awaiting repair, in transit or available for shipment. If that status is uncertain, planners may order additional stock unnecessarily, underestimate demand or schedule work around a part that cannot be delivered. Taxpayers can consequently fund more inventory without receiving a clear picture of whether the existing $31 billion pool is being used effectively.

The same uncertainty complicates efforts to improve F-35 availability. A Defense Department inspector general assessment cited alongside the findings put fleet availability at approximately 50 percent, describing the aircraft as “not available to fly half of the time.” Parts shortages are among the contributors to low availability, although the inventory findings alone do not quantify how many grounded aircraft resulted from missing database entries.

Physical counts have not closed the gap. Since fiscal 2020, the Joint Program Office has spent at least $17 million conducting inventories, but GAO found that the latest effort did not fully verify either that listed parts were physically present or that all parts had been recorded. The office says it is developing direct, real-time links between government and contractor systems, along with clearer procedures and training for officials responsible for government property.

The Pentagon agreed with all four GAO recommendations, including stronger monitoring of reported losses and clearer responsibilities for property officials. A full inventory being conducted with the Defense Contract Audit Agency is targeted for completion in March 2027. That count will be a critical test: the program must turn millions of scattered records into a dependable view of which F-35 parts exist, what they cost and where they can actually support an aircraft.

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By David Whitaker — Associate editor for AMI’s aerospace and drone systems desk, translating flight systems, aircraft programs, spaceflight, and UAV developments into accessible technical stories.

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