Russia Turned Its Own Crude Into 120,000 Tonnes of Gasoline at India’s Vadinar Refinery

Russia imported a record 172,000 tonnes of refined fuel in August 2026, more than seven times its previous monthly high, according to an analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. The volume was also three times Russia’s total oil-product imports for all of 2025.

Depressed refinery output and priority for domestic supply turned the pressure from Ukrainian drone strikes into a reversal of Russia’s normal fuel trade. A country historically known as a major exporter began sourcing products from South Korea and buying gasoline from India that had been refined from Russian crude.

The import total is not enormous beside Russia’s national fuel system, but its composition makes the shift significant. From 2023 through 2025, Russia averaged less than 5,000 tonnes of seaborne refined-product imports per month, with no imported cargoes unloaded at Russian ports in 13 of those 36 months. In August alone, imports were therefore roughly 34 times that earlier monthly average.

Gasoline changed the import mix

Gasoline accounted for 74% of Russia’s August oil-product imports, compared with only 6% during 2023–2025. India supplied 70% of all imported products and 94% of imported gasoline, including 120,000 tonnes loaded at the Vadinar refinery.

That flow illustrates the processing constraint more clearly than a simple shortage number. Vadinar took all of its crude from Russia during the first eight months of 2026, up from 81% across 2025. Rosneft also holds 49.13% of the refinery’s operator, Nayara Energy. Russian crude was thus sent abroad for conversion into gasoline and then returned as finished fuel adding transport, handling and insurance costs that domestic refining would ordinarily avoid.

South Korea supplied another 18,000 tonnes of oil products in August, mostly gasoil. That was 41% above the previous post-invasion monthly record set in July and eight times the three-year monthly average. The route also reflects a geographic constraint: South Korean products have historically served Russian Pacific ports that are difficult to supply from other refining centers.

This trade reversal does not mean Russia ceased exporting fuel altogether. It shows that national totals can hide regional and product-specific mismatches. A refining system may still produce exportable material while lacking enough gasoline or other required grades in the places and periods where domestic demand is strongest.

Station data show why imports became necessary

The downstream pressure was visible well before the August import total was compiled. An analysis of 478,685 reports to the GdeBENZ fuel-availability service covered 25,129 stations in 83 regions between July 4 and August 23. It was checked against 3.9 million banking-service records, which showed more card purchases at stations reported to have fuel and fewer where users reported none.

During the first shortage wave’s hardest period, July 8–11, gasoline was available at 56% to 64% of reporting stations when locations with lines were included. On July 11, lines were reported at 55% of stations that had fuel. Among reports that specified purchase restrictions, 75% cited a 30-liter limit and 23% a 20-liter limit.

The regional pattern also cautions against treating every refinery strike as producing an identical local result. After the July 30 attack on the Perm refinery, overall availability at nearby reporting stations fell from 55%–59% to 44%–53%. Availability also deteriorated following attacks affecting Orsk and Nizhnekamsk. Yet Yaroslavl improved after its refinery was attacked, while that plant’s exchange sales remained at about 86% of their usual volume.

That apparent contradiction is important. Refinery damage can tighten the national balance without determining conditions at every nearby filling station. Reserves, rerouted deliveries, demand changes and the severity of disruption all affect whether motorists encounter empty pumps, lines or limits. Some unstruck regions can consequently suffer severe shortages while an attacked region improves.

Imports bought supply at a logistical cost

Russia also used export restrictions, reserve releases and lower fuel-quality requirements to support domestic availability. Those measures can redirect or expand usable supply, but they do not restore damaged processing capacity. The International Energy Agency reported that refinery throughput had fallen to 3.8 million barrels per day in June, its lowest level in more than 20 years, and said the cumulative effect on refinery reliability remained uncertain.

The other side of the reversal appeared at export terminals. Revenue from seaborne oil-product exports unloaded at destination ports fell 32% from July to €78 million per day in August, its lowest level since the full-scale invasion began. Loaded oil-product volumes were less than half their August 2025 level.

August’s 172,000-tonne import record therefore measures more than emergency purchasing. It shows a processing and distribution system paying to bring finished fuel back into a country that still exports crude oil the concrete industrial consequence of refining capacity that could not meet the required product mix at home.

By Stephen Wallace — Editor for AMI’s aerospace integration and unmanned mobility coverage, focused on drone manufacturing, VTOL systems, autonomous networks, and air-ground mobility links.