FAA Disables Feature on 69 Routers, but Outage Cause Remains Unknown
The Federal Aviation Administration disabled a data-broadcast function on 69 routers after a nationwide ground stop and thousands of flight cancellations, but investigators have not established the outage’s root cause. As schedules approached normal on Monday, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy was also seeking another $50 billion for an air traffic control overhaul, beyond the $12.5 billion Congress approved last year.

About 250 U.S. flights had been canceled by 11 a.m. ET Monday, down from approximately 2,300 Sunday, 6,700 Saturday and more than 9,000 Friday. The reduction showed that airlines were working through the operational backlog by repositioning aircraft and ground crews. It did not close the technical investigation into why one disturbance propagated through a national communications network.
The FAA’s account of the disruption says its legacy telecommunications equipment became unstable as data flooded the network at a rate of 1,000 connection attempts every four to five seconds. Instability affected 17 of 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers and spread into several terminal radar facilities. Some radio frequencies and radar feeds remained reliable, and approximately 3,500 aircraft already airborne landed safely while departures were held.
Duffy said the event began during work to replace copper lines with fiber at an FAA site in El Dorado, Arkansas. When a new router was activated there, a recently installed router in Amarillo, Texas, began flooding the system, according to his description. The two devices are being examined at an L3Harris laboratory in Florida. Officials have found no evidence of a cyberattack.
A mitigation is not yet a root-cause finding
The immediate response was technically significant: the two locations were isolated, the network stabilized and the broadcasting function was disabled on routers of the identified type. That reduces exposure to the suspected overload path while investigators examine the equipment, its configuration and the work surrounding its installation.
It does not yet resolve whether the initiating problem came from hardware, configuration, procedure or an interaction between new equipment and the legacy network. Hewlett Packard Enterprise, which owns router manufacturer Juniper Networks, said the devices appeared to have operated as intended and “did not fail.” L3Harris said it was supporting the FAA investigation. Duffy said officials were examining both contractor performance and the possibility of faulty equipment.
That uncertainty affects how modernization money should be allocated. Replacing obsolete copper circuits with fiber addresses transmission capacity and the declining supportability of old lines, but a communications system also depends on network architecture, configuration control, monitoring, redundancy, acceptance testing and disciplined change management. Faster links alone cannot prevent an incorrectly distributed data load from reaching more of the network than intended.
The FAA faces a difficult systems-integration problem because the national airspace system must keep operating while its communications backbone is replaced. New and old equipment must coexist, and each transition can create interfaces that were absent in either architecture by itself. The agency said routine replacement work at remote facilities had been performed for decades without comparable effects, but it will reevaluate when such maintenance is conducted.
The $50 billion issue is larger than one router function
The additional $50 billion sought by Duffy has not been approved. Congress previously authorized $12.5 billion for modernization, while a separate presidential request called for $30 billion for a new air traffic control system. Those figures should not be treated as interchangeable: the scope, schedule and controls attached to each proposal determine what operational risk the spending would actually reduce.
A Government Accountability Office review found that the modernization effort lacked a reliable cost estimate and an integrated master schedule. As of May, it comprised 11,389 separate project schedules that were not coordinated across the program. For taxpayers and passengers, that creates a practical fairness issue. Delaying replacement leaves airlines and travelers exposed to disruption from aging infrastructure, while accelerating thousands of loosely coordinated changes can increase transition risk and raise the prospect of repeated work, delays or cost overruns.
History also argues for treating contractor oversight and network controls as core infrastructure. A Transportation Department inspector general review found that configuration and procedural errors by a contractor caused a 2009 FAA telecommunications outage that blocked about 75% of network traffic. The review said FAA oversight could have been more effective and proactive, even after corrective actions were taken.
Duffy has warned that disruptions remain possible until copper replacement is completed at the end of 2028. The more immediate milestone is the finding from the two routers now under examination: it must explain not only what generated the excessive traffic, but why the wider network allowed a localized change to disrupt national operations.
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By Thomas Caldwell — AMI’s senior editor for mechanical and mobility engineering, covering vehicle electronics, systems integration, electrification, chassis systems, propulsion, and safety policy.
