GPS Interference Hits Seven Schiphol Arrivals; Controllers Guide Them Down Safely

A roughly 20-minute GPS disruption affected dozens of aircraft near Amsterdam Airport Schiphol on November 9, 2026, leaving seven arriving planes with navigation problems. Air traffic controllers provided guidance, and all seven landed safely.

Image Credit to istockphoto.com

The interference began at about 6 p.m. A KLM crew reported that both of its GPS systems had failed, while a Scandinavian Airlines crew told the control tower it had been jammed. The failures occurred during a demanding phase of flight, but losing satellite navigation did not mean the aircraft had lost basic flight controls or every means of determining their position.

The unresolved part of the investigation is where the interference came from and who, if anyone, deliberately generated it. American data analyst John Wiseman traced a possible source to the North Sea north of Texel. Six Russian-flagged ships were in the area, including three vessels traveling in a navy-escorted arms convoy and listed under European Union sanctions.

No proof links those ships to the disruption. The Dutch digital infrastructure inspectorate, RDI, is investigating, and no ship, organization or state has been officially identified as responsible. Wiseman’s location is an analytical finding rather than a confirmed attribution.

Why the aircraft could keep flying

GPS is part of the broader global navigation satellite system used by modern aircraft for position, navigation and timing. Jamming overwhelms the weak signals arriving from satellites, preventing a receiver from maintaining a reliable lock. Spoofing is different: it feeds a receiver counterfeit signals that can produce incorrect position or timing data.

The crew reports near Schiphol were consistent with a loss or degradation of GPS reception. That can disable satellite-dependent procedures and create additional cockpit alerts, but airliners also carry other navigation capabilities. Pilots train for satellite-navigation outages, and controllers can issue headings to guide aircraft using independently validated surveillance.

That controller support was a crucial layer at Schiphol. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency’s guidance on satellite-navigation interference calls for air navigation providers to maintain contingency plans, preserve communications and surveillance coverage, and be prepared to provide radar vectoring when available. It also recommends retaining ground-based infrastructure such as instrument landing systems, distance-measuring equipment and radio navigation beacons.

For airlines, resilience begins before takeoff. EASA recommends that operators assess the consequences of losing onboard satellite navigation, train crews to recognize interference and ensure that backup systems needed in known affected areas are available. Crews are directed to verify their position using non-satellite means and remain ready to use an alternative procedure.

Those layers explain how a GPS outage can be managed without becoming a loss-of-control event. They do not make interference operationally harmless. An outage can increase pilot and controller workload, prevent the use of a planned satellite-based arrival or approach, and require longer routing, holding or a diversion. The impact depends on the duration, traffic density, flight phase and how heavily each aircraft’s systems depend on satellite data.

A recurring interference problem

The November 9 event was described as the second large-scale jamming incident to affect Dutch airspace this year. It also fits a wider increase in reported interference: EASA and the International Air Transport Association said GPS signal-loss events rose 220% between 2021 and 2024. Their mitigation plan calls for better reporting and monitoring, a minimum operational network of traditional navigation aids and stronger contingency planning.

Defence expert Peter Wijninga of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies assessed the Schiphol incident as consistent with activity intended to create “fear, uncertainty and confusion” in Europe. That is expert analysis, not an official finding assigning responsibility.

Wijninga identified a more serious scenario as coordinated interference that also severed communications between pilots and air traffic control. No such communications loss occurred near Schiphol. Controllers remained in contact and guided the seven arrivals safely, demonstrating why navigation backups, surveillance and a working radio link remain separate and essential defenses while RDI searches for the source.

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By David Whitaker — Associate editor for AMI’s aerospace and drone systems desk, translating flight systems, aircraft programs, spaceflight, and UAV developments into accessible technical stories.

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